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Abstract 
The paper examines how leading UK psychiatric geneticists talk about public 
engagement. Scientific fields have distinctive publics, with specific goals for, 
concerns with, and obstacles to engagement. In psychiatric genetics these publics 
include people with psychiatric disorders, policymakers, and even medics. We found 
that psychiatric geneticists justify public engagement by using the language of 
µstigma¶ in multiple ways. There is a belief in a deficit model of stigma ± that 
stigmatizing attitudes among the general public and government are the result of 
insufficient knowledge of the biological causes of psychiatric disorders. µStigma¶ is, 
however, also co-opted to do rhetorical work within biomedicine, marking differences 
in therapeutic optimism as pathological. We suggest that the wider field of UK 
psychiatry is seen as mostly consisting of therapeutic pessimists, while the psychiatric 
geneticists are in a minority of therapeutic optimists. These attitudes are the product 
of the historical and social context of the field.  
 
Key Words: Psychiatric Genetics, Public Engagement, Public Understanding of 
Science 
 
 2 
 
Introduction 
 
More than twenty years ago, Levy-Leblond (1992) argued for a more nuanced study 
RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ VFLHQFH DQG VFLHQWLVWV DQG WKH µSXEOLF¶ +H pointed out 
WKDWµWKHSXEOLF¶, accept and use complex science and technology ± driving  vehicles, 
interacting with computers and using sophisticated domestic appliances ± regardless 
of any Public Understanding of Science (PUS) programmes. That, since 1992, µWKH
SXEOLF¶KDVEHFRPHRYHUZKHOPLQJO\ ,7 OLWHUDWH further strengthens the point; people 
are generally capable of adapting to the changes of a technoscientific society with 
ease. Further still, citizens today think about themselves through scientific lenses. 
Nelkin and Lindee (1995) show how people reflect on their appearance and manner as 
genetic. This is not to say that, when it comes to science and technology, efforts to 
LQIRUPDQGHQJDJHµWKHSXEOLF¶DUHQRWLPSRUWDQW, but to stress the necessity of more 
critical approaches. Levy-Leblond ends his discussion by asking whether we should 
supplement studies of the public understanding of science, with studies of VFLHQWLVWV¶ 
understanding of the public (see Wynne, 1993).   
 
Studies of VFLHQWLVWV¶ understanding of the public have been conducted since Levy-
/HEORQG¶V HGLWRULDO. Few now WUHDW µVFLHQWLVW¶ DV D VLQJOH FDWHJRU\ as it is widely 
recognised that with scientific communities being culturally, as well as practically, 
different, such lumping together of a wide range of people working from various 
disciplines would confuse and dilute the insights that might be gained. Indeed, 
µVSOLWWLQJ¶ VFLHQWLVWV LV HDVLHU WKDQ GLYLGLQJ µWKH SXEOLF¶ scientists wear their 
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membership of the culturally, economically and politically GLVWLQFW µWULEHV¶ $EERWW
1998, 2001; Gieryn, 1999; Knorr-Cetina, 1999) on their lab coats.  
 
The risks, rewards, and practicalities of public engagement also vary tremendously 
between specialisms. When we talk about the PUS, what do we mean (Michael, 1992) 
when science is no single thing (Gieryn, 1999)? We can easily see that, for example, 
SXEOLFV¶ attitudes towards theoretical physics are not WKH VDPH DV SXEOLFV¶ DWWLWXGHV
towards fields of research that employ animal experimentation. Different sciences 
KDYH GLIIHUHQW UHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWK FHUWDLQ LQYHVWHG µSXEOLFV¶ ± patients, workers, 
consumers, protestors, etc. Given this, it is no surprise that we should expect scientists 
from different fields of work to have very different ± and often contradictory ± 
attitudes and understandings of publics, public understanding and public engagement.      
 
This paper though argues that the level of resolution required to understand the 
DWWLWXGHV RI µVFLHQWLVWV¶ WRZDUGV SXEOLF HQJDJHPHQW DQG FRPPXQLFDWLRQ QHHGV WR EH
particularly fine; our example of the distinct views of psychiatric geneticists would 
likely be obscured LQJHQHUDOVXUYH\VRIµJHQHWLFLVWV¶RUµSV\FKLDWULVWV¶DQGFHUWDLQO\
ZRXOG EH LQYLVLEOH WR VWXGLHV XVLQJ FDWHJRULHV VXFK DV µELRORJ\¶ RU µELRPHGLFLQH¶
This paper therefore considers the single field of psychiatric genetics. Psychiatric 
genetics has a history of political controversy and, when viewed by outsiders, 
scientific failure. This leads to particular attitudes towards engagement with distinct 
publics: patients, politicians, medical and psychiatric practitioners, scientific funders, 
DQGWKHµJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶. Using interviews with leading scientists working in the field, 
the paper explores the way in which this sub-group of scientists understand publics 
and public engagement. 
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Why Do Scientists Engage? 
 
Efforts to boost public understanding of / engagement with science have been part of 
United Kingdom science policy for the last three decades (Haran 2011; Miller, 2001). 
The µ%RGPHU5HSRUW¶ (The Royal Society, 1985) argued that, in a democratic society, 
public opinion is a major influence in science policy decision-making, and that an 
uninformed public would be vulnerable to misleading (and unscientific) ideas. 
Individuals would not only makHµSHUVRQDO¶ choices on the basis of these beliefs, but 
these ideas would affect their attitudes as citizens towards policy. The report 
recommended that the Royal Society should make improving the public 
understanding of science one of its major priorities.  
 
'HVSLWHWKLVµZDWHUVKHGPRPHQW¶=LPDQEHWZHHQDQGthe µScience and 
Society¶UHSRUW(House of Lords, 2000) there appeared to be little chanJHLQµVFLHQWLILF
OLWHUDF\¶ (Miller, 2001). Furthermore, the implicit argument justifying much public 
understanding of science policy: that increased understanding of science leads to 
increased public acceptance of science and the products and policies based on science, 
has not been supported by surveys of public opinion (Weldon, 2004). The so-called 
µdeficit model¶ of public understanding of science appeared to be failing to deliver 
(Gross, 1994; Miller, 2001) and thus became a target for social-scientific critique 
(Stilgoe, 2007).    
 
The deficit model assumes that negative public attitudes towards science are the result 
of a knowledge deficit that can be corrected by providing the public with more 
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scientific information. Critics of this approach proposed models of public 
understanding and engagement - based on dialogue that take account of the ways in 
which people use, define, and make sense of science (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Miller, 
2001). It follows that such approaches to PUS PXVWFRQVLGHUµSXEOLFV¶UDWKHUWKDQµWKH
SXEOLF¶ since different groups engage with and understand science in different ways 
(Renn, 2006; Turney, 1996).  Despite these arguments and criticisms (Irwin and 
Michael, 2003), large-scale surveys designed to capture the DWWLWXGHVRI µWKH pXEOLF¶
dominate official reports on the public understanding of science (see, for example, 
Besley and Nisbet, 2013; Ipsos MORI, 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding its criticisms, the Bodmer Report led to increasing encouragement 
for scientific fields to open up to the public (Haran, 2012). Although the language 
might have since shifted (Miller, 2001), 30 years on the call for scientists to engage 
with publics has never been louder (Barnett et al. 2012; Bauer, Allum and Miller, 
2007; Davies, 2008; Poliakoff and Webb, 2007; Wilsdon and Willis, 2004 ;). In the 
UK, funding bodies such as the Medical Research Council (MRC) encourage their 
scientists to communicate and discuss their work with public groups, with such 
activities commonly described as public engagement (Research Council United 
Kingdom, 2013).        
 
In UK academic science, public engagement or (PEST) ± the Public Engagement with 
Science and Technology (Irwin, Jensen and Jones, 2013) is no longer merely an 
abstract civic responsibility; it is also a metric considered when allocating research 
funding (Pearson, 2001). Today, universities have a µduty¶ to communicate with the 
public and to engage with public groups and non-expert communities (Times Higher 
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Education, 2009). Indeed, the Research Excellence Framework (REF) places greater 
emphasis on WKHµLPSDFW¶RIUHVHDUFK than its predecessor, the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) i . This has led to academic departments investing in public 
engagement, which is understood by some institutions as a pathway to (or 
synonymous with) impact (Ponting, 2011; Watermeyer, 2012). Prestigious prizes are 
awarded to those who promote the public understanding of science and funding 
applications have sections to complete on public engagement. Accordingly, with the 
terms and conditions under which science is produced, circulated, and accredited 
changing (Porter, et al., 2012), explorations of the ways in which µVFLHQWLVWV¶
conceptualise ideas of µthe public¶DQGµSXEOLFV¶ and WKHLUPRWLYDWLRQVWRµengage¶ is 
particularly timely (Davies, 2008: Poliakoff and Webb, 2007; Stilgoe, 2007). 
 
The Challenge for Psychiatry and Psychiatric Genetics 
Psychiatric genetics - and its public profile ± has particular characteristics that 
distinguish it from other fields of biomedicine. These differences are not only 
scientific ± psychiatric illnesses are difficult to diagnose, and such diagnoses are 
unlikely to map directly onto biological categories (Burmeister, McInnes and Zöllner, 
2008; Morgan, McKenzie and Fearon, 2008; Green, 2014) ± but also political ± 
governments have a history of misusing and abusing both psychiatry and notions of 
biological heritability (Propping, 2005; Kerr and Shakespeare, 2002). Psychiatric 
genetics has inherited a controversial history from its parent disciplines (Arribas-
Ayllon, Bartlett and Featherstone, 2010; Sedgwick, 1982; Turney and Turner, 2000). 
As Propping (2005) writes µ7KHIDOVHGRFWULQHRIHXJHQLFVDQGLWVSUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQ
by the Nazi regime paved the way for the development of a prevailing anxiety in 
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society that psychiatric genetics might lead to stigmatisation or even a revitalisation of 
HXJHQLFV¶S 
 
Yet there is optimism in psychiatric genetics, arising from the belief that mental 
illnesses are understandable in biological terms and, therefore, medically tractable 
(Craddock and Owen, 2010; Kauffman, Johnson and Pardes, 1996; Stoltenberg and 
Burmeister, 2000). Writing about the new genetics in general, Kerr, Cunningham-
Burley and Amos (1997) have illustrated that, with these visions of the past and the 
future co-H[LVWLQJ LQ WKH SUHVHQW JHQHWLFLVWV WHQG WR FOHDUO\ GHPDUFDWH WKH µHXJHQLF
SDVW¶LQZKLFKLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWKHUHGLW\ZDVSXWWRXVHE\WKHVWDWHIURPDIXWXUHLQ
which individuals and families use genomic information for their own benefit. 
 
The way in which psychiatric geneticists present a narrative of their discipline is 
therefore important, with current perceptions of psychiatry and psychiatric genetics 
ambivalent at best. Smith (2008) argues that few people, apart from psychiatrists, care 
about the practice of psychiatry. Yet they should, he argues, as the burden of mental 
illness is enormous. Treating mental illness accounts for 10.8% (£10.4 billion per year) 
of the National Health Service budget (Department of Health, 2010), While the cost 
of work-related mental ill health is estimated to be another £30 billion per year 
(Centre for Mental Health, 2010). Some doubt that psychiatry will ride to the rescue, 
arguing that advances in treating psychiatric disorders have been rare (Hamer, 2002). 
However, the argument that these sorts of statistics demand that psychiatry should be 
of public interest, is not only (or even at all) a high-PLQGHGDUJXPHQWWKDWµWKHSXEOLF¶
should be able to play their part as citizens (Irwin, 2001), but that psychiatry needs a 
public. Disciplines need public and political support else they become marginalised. 
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Public engagement in psychiatry should therefore be constituted in a way that would 
both serve a common good and maintain the standing of the profession (Smith, 2008).  
 
In psychiatric genetics, scientists face the added challenge of genetic stigmatisation 
(Propping, 2005). Stigma is widely recognised as one of the biggest obstacles to 
mental healthcare (Sartorius, 2007), and efforts to understand and reduce stigmatising 
attitudes are central to many public programmes that deal with mental health (Time to 
Change, 2010, 2011). However, there is the fear that the geneticisation of mental 
illness could reinforce stigma (Goldacre, 2010; Rose, 1998).  In the accounts on 
public engagement provided by psychiatric geneticists in this paper, references to 
stigma feature prominentlyZLWKDµGHILFLWPRGHO¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJof the role of public 
engagement common ± informing the public of the genetics of mental illness will 
reduce stigma, bringing public attitudes in line with the attitudes of the scientists.  
 
However, while researchers speak of public engagement as a means to tackle the 
µstigma¶ of mental illness, we find that they also refer to the µstigma¶ that they face as 
psychiatrists and as psychiatric geneticists. Researchers express concerns regarding 
the standing of psychiatry and psychiatric genetics within medicine and the effect this 
has on spoiling (Goffman, 1963) their professional identity. As we have described, the 
history of the politicisation of both psychiatry (see Crossley, 2006 for psychiatry and 
social movements), and genetics has left its mark on the field. Propping described the 
way in which WKLV µVLQLVWHU KLVWRU\¶ hangs over the field as if it were µ'DPRFOHs¶ 
sword¶ (Joseph, 2006, p151; Propping, 2005, p3). More, unlike some other branches 
of research into the genetics of illnesses, psychiatric genetics has a history of failing 
WRPHHWRSWLPLVWLFSUHGLFWLRQVIRUWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIµJHQHVIRU«¶And further still, 
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regardless of advances in genetics, from Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS) 
to Next-Generation Sequencing (NGS), psychiatric genetics struggles to a far greater 
degree with classification and, relatedly, the identification of biomarkers, than 
µVRPDWLF¶LOOQHVVHV.  Against this background, psychiatric genetics must engage with 
the public.  
 
The Centre: the Research Setting  
This paper focusses on a single, internationally significant, laboratory ± the Centre. 
The Centre includes laboratory-based and clinical researchers, conducting genetics 
and genomics research to understand the biological causes of mental illness.  The 
paper draws on empirical evidence from two inter-related research projects at the 
Centre conducted between 2009 and 2012. As such, the research can be considered a 
case study (Thomas, 2011). 
 
The first project (2009-2010) was a small-scale qualitative study consisting of nine 
interviews with senior academics, both clinicians and laboratory scientists, heavily 
involved in public engagement. 7KH SURMHFW H[SORUHG VFLHQWLVWV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI
publics and their reasons for µengaging¶ 7KHDXWKRUVGLGQRWGHILQHµSXEOLFV¶IRUWKH
interview participants; interview participants chose which groups to discuss as publics 
and with which psychiatric genetics needed to engage. 
 
The second project (2009±2012) consisted of 20 interviews with scientists at the 
Centre. Respondents were a mix of early-career and senior researchers. The focus of 
the project was to explore the work practices of the field of psychiatric genetics as it 
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EHFDPH D µELJ VFLHQFH¶ (Authors; Arribas-Ayllon, Bartlett and Featherstone, 2010; 
Sullivan, 2011). 
 
In addition to interview data, ethnographic research informs the analyses of this paper. 
Author 2 spent time in the &HQWUH¶V laboratories, and attended seminars and 
conferences with members of the Centre. Author 1 was employed by the Centre as a 
sociologist, with additional public engagement duties. Not being a psychiatric 
geneticist, his position granted him a level of critical distance. To a degree, Author 1 
can be said to have been performing inadvertent participatory action research (Whyte, 
1991), organising public engagement activities for psychiatric genetics/geneticists 
while thinking critically and sociologically about publics and engagement.  
 
The Centre itself has played important roles in GWAS of mental illness. This type of 
research is µbig VFLHQFH¶ (Hevly, 1992). Large-scale science requires significant 
resources; technical, economic, cultural and social, the maintenance of which often 
UHTXLUHV VXSSRUW IURP VSHFLILF µSXEOLFV¶. In particular, this kind of research into 
human health requires access to research participants ± people with psychiatric 
disorders. Successful research therefore demands the support of people with 
psychiatric disorders, along with their families, carers, and medical professionals. 
From the research participants material of scientific value is extracted ± which in 
psychiatric genetics includes not only DNA but also detailed mental health histories 
derived from case notes and in-depth face-to-face interviews. 8QOLNHPRVWµVRPDWLF¶
illnesses, detailed phenotypic data can only be collected by engaging with the 
UHVHDUFK SDUWLFLSDQW¶V VXEMHFWLYLW\ 7KHUH DUH QR FRQYHQLHQW ELRORJLFDO PDUNHUV IRU
disorders such as schizophrenia. Further, given that psychiatric geneticists are wary of 
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treating disorders such as schizophrenia as if they are mapped one-to-one onto a 
single underlying biology, it is considered important to collect detailed phenotypic 
data as a way of tackling the phenotypic and (presumed) biological heterogeneity of 
the disorderii. Public engagement is seen as one way to promote and help recruit 
participants to these projects.  
 
The imperatives and demands involved in public engagement with psychiatric 
genetics (and other big biomedical projects) are therefore distinct from those that 
figure in some other scientific fields.  The Centre has to invest in its publics in order 
to do research. As part of this investment, in 2009, the Centre launched a public 
engagement programme, designed to engage with a variety of publics. This paper 
explores how scientists at the Centre conceptualise the public, their reasons for 
engaging with publics, and the messages they want to communicate. Interview 
extracts have been anonymised, with details of particular programmes of research 
omitted. 
 
The Publics of Psychiatric Genetics 
 
Studies in the public understanding of science show us that we should not think of the 
public as a homogenous group, but rather that we should think of publics as they 
relate to science (Renn, 2006; Wynne, 1995). Unsurprisingly, scientists at the Centre 
have publics that they prioritise. We can separate these publics into four types. The 
first group is µthe general SXEOLF¶. 
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 ³:KR GR , WKLQN my public is? I suppose I would like to think there [are] 
 several. 2EYLRXVO\ WKHUH¶V WKH NLQG RI general public, the people reading 
 newspapers and magazines, and watching television [«] I would like to get 
DFURVVWRWKHP´Professor Norris). 
 
To this µJeneral public¶, scientists at the Centre want to convey general messages 
about the science and the (potential) impact of research. 
 
 ³[«] The more general message is about the importance of research in mental 
 health and the stigma and understanding illness and complexity and that is 
 really, I think, aimed at the very widest possible spectrum of the public´
 (Professor Davidson). 
 
These general messages cover ground which includes developments in understandings 
of the brain, the stigma of mental illness, and the complexity of psychiatric research. 
3URIHVVRU6WHYHQVRQ¶Vdescription of the messages that she wants to communicate is 
typical.  
 
³,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHSXEOLFWKLQJ>KDV@PRYHGRQ>from] complex disease, genes 
being deterministic. I think the other thing [« for] people to realise [is] 
WKDW«IRU WKHVH VRUWV RI VWXGLHV ZH¶UH RQO\ FDSWXULQJ D YHU\ OLPLWHG W\SH RI
JHQHWLFYDULDWLRQ7KHUH¶VVWLOOORDGVRIJHQHWLFUHVHDUFKWRJRRQEHIRUHZH¶UH
FDSWXULQJ DOO WKH YDULDWLRQ $QG RI FRXUVH WKHUH¶V QRQ-inherited factors [«] 
These complexities have got environmental contributions, [especially] for 
some of WKHGLVRUGHUVZH¶UHVWXG\LQJ´Professor Stevenson). 
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Getting across to the public the complexity in psychiatric genetics is seen as a priority. 
As well as the mHVVDJH WKDW WKHUH ZLOO EH QR µJHQH IRU¶ GLVFRYHULHV Professor 
Stevenson stresses that it is also important to communicate the incomplete nature of 
the science and that there is still more research to be done.  
 
While the messages will be different between disciplines, every scientific discipline 
has a µgeneral public¶. Although we see how issues specific to psychiatric genetics are 
raised when discussing engagement with the general public (for instance, stigma and 
complexity), the differences between scientific specialisms become pronounced when 
specific publics are considered. We will discuss three of psychiatric genetics most 
prominent publics; people with mental illnesses, medical professionals, and policy 
makers.  
 
Psychiatric genetics requires the participation of people with psychiatric conditions in 
order for research to be done. In psychiatric genetics, this participation is much more 
involved than in other large-scale genetics research, for example detailed interviews 
covering distressing periods in the SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ lives are required. Engaging with this 
group of people is seen as a priority at the Centre.  
 
³)or me ± a key group that I think to do some work and to interact  with is - is 
SHRSOHZLWKSV\FKLDWULFGLVRUGHUV´Professor Johnson). 
 
And: 
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³7he people I think would have most interest are those that have experience of 
[the disorder] either within their families or are concerned about developing it 
themselves in ODWHUOLIHIRUYDULRXVUHDVRQV´ (Professor Wilson). 
 
Despite all senior staff recognising that people with psychiatric disorders are a key 
group to engage with there were differences in priority. Professor Johnson points out 
that the interests of clinicians and those of laboratory scientists can be quite different, 
and that these differences influence the publics that they wish to engage.  
 
³,I , KDG WR FKRRVH RQH JURXS ZKHUH , WKRXJKW µ\HDK LW ZRXOG EH ZRUWK
FRQFHQWUDWLQJ¶ >WKRVH ZLWK SV\FKLDWULF FRQGLWLRQV@ ZRXOG EH IRU
PH«2EYLRXVO\ WKDW¶V JRLQJ WR EH GLIIHUHQW IRU RWKHU SHRSOH LQ WKH Centre. I 
think probably the perspective [«] comes from being a clinician scientist [...] 
It strikes me as a clinical academic what you have is contact (in your clinical 
work as well as your research) with people [and] ZLWKWKHGLVRUGHUVWKDW\RX¶UH
studying and so taking advantage of that, building on that seems very sensible 
WRPHZKLFKLI\RX¶UHDEDVLFVFLHQWLVWWKHQWKHUHPD\EH [«] other groups that 
you are targeting.´3URIHVVRU Johnson). 
 
Such differences - even between psychiatric geneticists - only highlight the necessity 
for science and scientists to be considered in their variety. Clinical researchers work 
with different materials and do different things to the geneticists in the laboratory. 
This shapes their view of public engagement even when working on the same projects. 
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Medical professionals are another priority public for psychiatric geneticists. Scientists 
at the Centre hope that their work will inform medical practice.  Some might argue 
that these medical professionals are not publics, but rather are a group of people with 
[competing] expertise in mental illness. Nevertheless, by and large medical 
professionals are not the disciplinary peers of psychiatric geneticists. The scientists at 
the Centre are not [only] engaging medical professionals in a general discussion of 
mental illness, but are attempting to get this group to engage with the specific findings 
of psychiatric genetics, of which they are, as a group, non-experts. The psychiatric 
geneticists at the Centre are not imagining that medical professionals will be engaging 
with the findings of their research by way of seminars and papers, but by methods and 
material designed for communicating with people outside the discipline. Medical 
professionals, in common with other stakeholders in issues of mental illness, such as 
patients, families and policymakers, do have expertise in mental illness. However, in 
general, the practicing psychiatrist does not have the disciplinary competence ± 
neither contributory nor interactional expertise (Collins and Evans, 2002) ± in 
psychiatric genetics. Even if this is not the case, among the psychiatric geneticists at 
the Centre there was a presumption that medical professionals dealing with mental 
illness were largely ignorant of - and in some cases resistant to ± genetic 
understandings of psychiatric disorders. The scientists imagine and understand 
engaging with these groups as if they were publicsiii. 
  
³7KHUH¶V FOHDUO\ WKH WHFKQLFDO DVSHFWV RI ZKDW ZH GR , ZRXOG VD\ WKDW LW¶V
psychiatrists and neuroscience researchers are the main people that that is 
aimed at.´3URIHVVRU'DYLGVRQ. 
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And: 
 
³, ZRXOG OLNH WR JHW DFURVV WKLQJV WR RWKHU KHDOWKFDUH PHQWDO KHDOWK
 professionals [...] I think some of them/us are responsible for all these 
incorrect ideas about stigPD´3URIHVVRU1RUULV. 
 
According to Barker (2004), WKH ODQJXDJH RI HQJDJHPHQW µVXJJHVWV DQ HOHPHQW RI
UHFLSURFDO DQG FROODERUDWLYH NQRZOHGJH SURGXFWLRQ« >WKDW UHTXLUHV@ FROODERUDWLRQ
ZLWK FRPPXQLWLHV LQ WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI NQRZOHGJH¶ S  Psychiatric geneticists 
work within the wider worlds of psychiatry and healthcare. Even if one were to 
suggest that these groups should not properly be thought of as publics and more as 
critical audiences, the fact is that scientists at the Centre understood healthcare 
professionals as a public to engage with in their public engagement programme. 
Therefore aQ H[SORUDWLRQ RI VFLHQWLVWV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI SXEOLFV DQG SXEOLF
engagement must consider this.  Note also the assumption that informing publics of 
the findings of psychiatric genetics will reduce stigma ± this is a recurrent theme in 
the interviews. 
 
The final priority group are policy makerV :KLOH µWKH SXEOLF¶ PLJKW, in theory, 
support research through taxation, it is politicians and policy makers who decide on 
the details and distributions. This is true of any science, no matter how distant its 
content is from the concerns of state and civil society. Psychiatric genetics, however, 
as with all biomedical science, promises findings of significance to policy makers.  
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³Then I suppose there are the sorts RISHRSOHZKRLQIOXHQFHSROLF\DQGVRRQ´
(Professor Norris) 
 
And: 
 
³7he more general message is about the importance of research in mental 
health and the stigma and understanding illness and  complexity WKDW¶V UHDOO\ 
[...] aimed at the very widest possible spectrum of the public which would 
include politicians and policy makers.´(Professor Davidson). 
 
Politicians and policy makers DQGWKHµJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶are targets for engagement as 
they are the funders of science. All sciences need to maintain political support 
(Yearley, 2005). As a biomedical science though, psychiatric genetics also needs to 
engage more specific publics who might use the content of their research. Most 
specifically, psychiatric genetics needs to engage with a public consisting of people 
with psychiatric disorders. Public engagement at the Centre is understood as a way to 
attract participants by communicating the value, purpose, and promise of the science. 
Public engagement is, therefore, in no small part understood as an activity that 
maintains the resources required to do science. 
 
The Promise of Psychiatric Genetics  
 
The promise of psychiatric genetics is that mental illnesses will be rendered diseases 
like any other. Not only will mental illness be understandable biologically, and 
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medically tractable, but the stigma specifically associated with mental illness will be 
undone. 
 
³,DPYHU\NHHQWRSHUVXDGHSHRSOHWKDWSV\FKLDWULFGLVRUGHUVDUHWUDFWDEOHWR
VFLHQWLILFDSSURDFKHVZKLFK,GRQ¶WWKLQN that everybody believes. I think [«] 
there is a prevailing view now in society and amongst politicians WKDWWKH\¶UH
untreatable, chronic conditions that require social care and the main thing that I 
want to get across to people is that these [...] severe psychiatric disorders are 
disorders of the brain that can be approached by genetics and neurosciences 
and that that is the way to develop new treatments.´Professor Norris).   
 
A short history of classifications in psychiatry is important here. The current 
psychiatric classificatory system, based on grouping disorders together by common 
patterns of symptoms, owes much to the 19th century psychiatrist, Emil Kraepelin. 
However, the usefulness of the Kraepelinian classificatory system has recently been 
called into question (Jablensky, 1999; Craddock and Owen, 2007; Craddock and 
Owen, 2010).  
 
These questions may precede a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970) in psychiatry. Psychiatric 
geneticists anticipate that a better understanding of the biology of mental illness ± 
derived from techniques such as GWAS, NGS, and brain imaging - will produce 
diagnoses that better match the underlying biology and, as Professor Norris describes, 
improved treatments. The system used to classify psychiatric disorders will be aligned 
with that of other medical fields (Singh and Rose, 2009). To quote prominent 
psychiatric geneticists, ³7KH KLVWRU\ RI PHGLFLQH suggests that therapeutic and 
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prognostic decision-making are usually facilitated, often greatly, as classifications 
move closer to the underlying biological mechanisms. For this reason, it is desirable 
to move towards a classification that maps the expression of illness onto the 
underlying biological systems´Craddock and Owen, 2010, p94). 
 
Scientists working in psychiatric genetics are keen to present the specialism as 
essentially the same as other branches of biomedicine. For Professor Norris, one 
function of public engagement is to inform people of the biological basis of mental 
illness. This, he argues, will challenge the stigma that arises from beliefs that mental 
illness is outside the scope of biomedical understanding and treatment. µSociety needs 
WR NQRZ ZKDW ZRUN WKH FHQWUH LV FRQGXFWLQJ¶ in order to ensure that µVRFLHW\ DQG
SROLWLFLDQV¶ are ready for therapies derived from psychiatric genetics. Understandings 
of psychiatry as fundamentally biomedical are therefore coupled with an attitude of 
therapeutic optimism.  
 
As a therapeutic optimist, the psychiatric geneticist must believe in the efficacy of 
pharmaceuticals and other medical treatments. However, Professor Norris suggests 
that society is dominated by therapeutic pessimists.  Public engagement is justified as 
a means to change public attitudes by making them aware of the biological basis of 
psychiatric disorders. This µdeficit model¶ approach to public engagement often draws 
on the example of other fields of medical research. Amongst centre members, it is 
common for psychiatric genetics to be compared to the position of cancer research in 
the middle of the twentieth century. 
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³Forty, fifty years ago, cancer was regarded as an incurable condition that was 
YHU\VWLJPDWLVHGSHRSOHGLGQ¶WWDONDERXWLW:KHQ,ZDVDPHGLFDOVWXGHQWRQ
the ward, you never told someone they had cancer. [«]YRXVDLGµ:HOO\RX¶YH
got a bit of a growWKRU \RX¶YH JRW DQHR-plastic disorder¶And people often 
ZRXOGQ¶WEHWROGWKDWWKH\ZHUHJRLQJWRGLHWKDWWKH\ZHUHWHUPLQDEOH$QG
people would never use the word and were ashamed of it.  What happened is, 
in spite of that, [researchers] had this sort of war on cancer, money was put 
into research big-time and it became the norm for every single patient, pretty 
much, with cancer, to be in a drug trial of some sort, or part of research.  That 
improved the care because it attracted smart people into wanting to do it.  
Smart people want to do things that are exciting, in a way that they can make a 
difference [«] It raised the profile and people started to talk about [it], and 
QRZ\RX¶YHJRWWRWKHVLWXDWLRQZKHUHFDQFHU¶VPXFKOHVVVWLJPDWLVHGDQGDOVR
that there are [«] plenty [of] new treatments around.  And this is where we are 
now in mental illness. 
 
It would make a great difference though, if we were doing research in clinics 
[«] /RRNDW$O]KHLPHU¶V$O]KHLPHU¶VLVPXFKOHVVVWLJPDWLVHGWKDQGHPHQWLD
uVHG WR EH DQG WKDW¶V EHFDXVH LW KDV D QDPH EXW LW¶V DOVR EHFDXVH LW KDV
SDWKRORJ\ LWKDVVRPHSRWHQWLDO WUHDWPHQW LWKDVVRPHJHQHWLFV 7KDWKDVQ¶W
PDGH LWPRUHVWLJPDWLVHG LW¶VPXFK OHVV VWLJPDWLVHG [«] If we could do the 
same for schizophrenia or biSRODU GLVRUGHU DQG GHSUHVVLRQ WKDW¶V ZKDW ZH
want.´ (Professor Norris). 
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The argument goes that, if public groups would treat psychiatry and psychiatric 
genetics as just another branch of biomedicine and mental illnesses as diseases like 
any other then the stigma of mental illness would be reduced. For Professor Norris, 
this argument should be the impetus driving psychiatric geneticists to engage. Stigma 
is produced by ignorance of underlying biology.   
 
A wide variety of medical conditions have been stigmatised at one time or another 
(Scambler, 1998, 2009), but the stigma of mental illnesses appears particularly 
damaging and resilient (Goffman, 1968; MacRae, 1999). Professor Norris describes a 
past in which people were too ashamed to even say the word µFDQFHU¶. Many cancers 
were untreatable, fatal conditions. The medical profession waged µwari¶ on the disease, 
and the improved understanding and treatment of cancer, led, so Professor Norris 
argues, to a reduction in stigmatising attitudes. Within psychiatry, Professor Norris 
SRLQWV WR $O]KHLPHU¶V disease as a case in which increased knowledge has led to 
optimism for future treatments and, in doing so, reduced the associated stigma.  
 
3URIHVVRU1RUULV¶VDFFRXQWis that of a therapeutic optimist. Mental illness is a disease 
like any other. They are biologically tractable, which will lead to treatments. In turn, 
this will reduce stigmatising attitudes. This makes the basis for an appeal for public 
support and the maintenance of the resources required for research. These arguments 
privilege the power of scientific knowledge to change society. Therapeutic pessimists, 
by contrast, are likely to prioritise discussions of the role of the history, culture, and 
politics of mental illness and stigma.  
 
                                                 
i
 The metaphor of waging war on a disease is commonplace in biomedicine (Gwyn, 2002; Vincent, 
2007). 
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Professor Edwards provided a similar, if slightly more conservative, perspective. He 
was asked what he would like public engagement to have achieved over the next five 
to ten years. 
 
³That people with certain [«] types of illness, and their relatives and so on, 
would be aware that this stuff [research] was going on and that we were a 
JURXS«>WKDW@ LI \RX ZDQWHG LQIRUPDWLRQ or you wanted to participate in 
research, would be [your] first point of call. The way people with sick kids 
know of Ormond Street, the way many people with cancer know of the cancer 
research foundation ± you know, all these type of things. I mean, psychiatry, 
psychiatry research, psychiatric illness, is really not known about by people 
who need to know about it.  Now how much benefit they'll get out of it in that 
short time frame is a different matter. But it would be good for people to have 
a feeling of optimism that the cure is not round the corner, there may never be 
the cure, but that there was at least some kind of momentum´ (Professor 
Edwards). 
 
Professor Edwards tempers WKHOLQHDURSWLPLVPRIµUHVHDUFKĺNQRZOHGJHĺWUHDWPHQW¶
by saying; µWKHUHPD\QHYHUEH WKHFXUH¶1RQHWKHOHVV this account is still that of a 
therapeutic optimist who sees in public engagement an opportunity to spread this 
optimism. All science (Haran, 2011) involves telling stories about a potential future; 
not all have to deal with a past containing abuses and unfulfilled promises. Psychiatric 
geneticists often rely on drawing a comparison with other branches of biomedicine 
that are free from such troubled histories.  
 
$Q,OOQHVV/LNH$Q\2WKHU« 
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At the Centre, comparisons between psychiatric genetics and cancer research are not 
limited to the standing of the fields and the stigma associated with the conditions. 
Centre members also draw parallels between the role of genetics in cancer and mental 
illness. The Centre¶V H[SHUWLVH OLHV LQ conducting genetic research to discover 
susceptibility genes for psychiatric disorders. Susceptibility genes increase the risk, 
sometimes by a very small degree, of developing a disease. The model of genetic 
contribution to common mental illness is understood to one of many genes, each of 
small effect. This is unlike the classical Mendelian genetics with which the public are 
familiar, in which a mutation in a single gene plays a major role in determining 
whether or not a person develops a disease. When Centre members face public 
audiences, they make comparisons to the genetics of diabetes, heart disease, cancer, 
etc. to explain what they mean when they say thaWµPHQWDOLOOQHVVHVDUHJHQHWLF¶  
 
³IW
V SDUWLFXODUO\ D FKDOOHQJH ZKHQ \RX XVH WKH PHGLD«<RX FDQQRW UHDGLO\
explain these things in ten seconds, or two sentences. So it is a huge challenge 
[«] When I try and do it, I kind of resort to analogies that people maybe 
understand a bit clearer in their own life, which people [might grasp] slightly 
better - concepts like risk of heart disease where not everyone who doesn't 
exercise dies of a heart attack next week.  And then not everyone who does 
exercise stays immune from heart attacks. People [«] they don't necessarily 
understand it very well, but, I mean, there are a lot of analogies and that's how 
I tend to do it. But it's pretty difficult to get people to understand it, or for me 
to be able to persuade people [to support the research] or for me to be able to 
communicate it, I do acknowledge that.´3URIHVVRU(GZDUGV 
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Due to the challenges of communicating psychiatric genetics to publicV¶Vcientists at 
WKH&HQWUHXVHWKHµPHQWDOLOOQHVVLVOLNHDQ\RWKHULOOQHVV¶DUJXPHQWcf. Read et al., 
2006) not only to challenge stigma, but also in order to provide a short-cut to explain 
the role genetics plays in mental illness. Diseases such as cancer or diabetes provide a 
reference point with which the public are familiar, allowing scientists to avoid the task 
of explaining complex genetics from first principles. In addition, improvements in our 
understandings of, and treatments for, these conditions, ties psychiatric genetics to 
stories of success.  
 
Professor Davidson also discussed the difficulties of explaining the genetic nature of 
mental illness.  
 
³A lot of it relates to the fact that people already have ingrained and 
stereotyped attitudes [and] so they are not very receptive to a different way of 
looking at it.  FRUH[DPSOHLIVRPHRQH¶VPDGHXSWKHLUPLQGWKDWPHQWDOLOOQHVV 
[«] GHSUHVVLRQVD\LVDFKDUDFWHUZHDNQHVVDQGLW¶VQRWDQLOOQHVVDQGDOOWKH
UHVW RI LW LW¶V DOPRVW LPSRVVLEOH WR HYHQ VWDUW D GLVFXVVLRQ RU D FRQYHUVDWLRQ
because the person [is] just closed to that. [«]  
 
TKDW¶VWKHELJJHVWSUREOHP. I think [«] an interesting example came out with 
all the [news] publicity [«] around the [recent] finding. I think the bit that 
seemed to touch with everyone were the words [that were reported as] [«] µso 
this shows that [this] is a genetic disorder¶ ± QRZ,KDYHWRVD\,¶PQRWVXUH,
would have necessarily used those words myself but when we discussed it 
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people agreed that if someone had said µoh so this research shows that heart 
disease is a genetic disorder or diabetes is a genetic disorder or cancer is a 
genetic disorder¶ actually people would have understood what that meant in 
the sense that they would have been much more comfortable with that, but 
because it was a psychiatric or behavioural problem it was completely 
different« So if someone had said so WKDWVKRZVWKDW$O]KHLPHU¶VLVDJHQHWLF
GLVHDVHWKHUHZRXOGQ¶WKDYHEHHQDSXEOLFRXWFU\. [«] 8QOHVVWKHUH¶VDOHYHORI
SXEOLF HQJDJHPHQW \RX FDQ¶W SRVVLEO\ WUDQVIHU WKH ILQGLQJV LQWR ZD\V RI
actually changing behaviour and treatment DQG VHUYLFHV WKDW¶V RQH WKLQJ´
(Professor Davidson). 
 
3URIHVVRU'DYLGVRQ¶V DFFRXQW paints a clear picture of the particular challenges that 
psychiatric genetics faces when trying to engage with the public. Not only is there 
resistance WRWKHYHU\LGHDWKDWSV\FKLDWULFGLVRUGHUVDUHµLOOQHVVHV¶EXWWKHUHDUHYHU\
different reactions to the genetic explanations for psychiatric disorders than for 
µVRPDWLF¶ LOOQHVVHV iv. Again, this points to a need to consider scientists¶ attitudes 
towards public engagement at the very µlocal¶ scale ± the particular challenges facing 
psychiatric geneticists are not generalisable to other biomedical geneticists, much less 
the life sciences as a whole.   
 
7KDWVRPHWKLQJLVµJHQHWLF¶PHDQVVRPHWKLQJGLfferent in WKHVHµpublic¶SODFHV than it 
does in the laboratory. There is no µgene for¶ the disorders that the Centre research ± 
as with most things in psychiatric genetics it is a lot more complicated than that 
(Arribas-Ayllon, Bartlett and Featherstone, 2010 6XOOLYDQ 'DO\ DQG 2¶'RQRYDQ
2012). In the laboratory, that everyone understands the caveats that spring from the 
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complexity of the genetics under discussion can be taken for granted. A non-specialist 
DXGLHQFH3URIHVVRU'DYLGVRQIHDUVKHDUVµJHQHWLF¶DVµJHQH IRU¶. Despite recognising 
that the findings could have been better communicated, Professor Davidson maintains 
that if the story had been about a physical illness there would be no controversy.  And, 
SRVVLEO\QR µVWRU\¶ LQ WKH MRXUQDOLVWLF Vense, a fact that reminds us that in order to 
engage with a public an audience is needed. Therefore, when scientists engage with 
the public they must deal with the existing understandings of their science (Turney, 
1996). For each science the existing understandings are different, presenting diverse 
challenges to public engagement.  
 
At the beginning of the quoted extract, Professor Davidson inadvertently 
acknowledges the criticism of the deficit model. Many people already have 
µNQRZOHGJH¶ about mental illness; as he puts it, µstereotypical attitudes¶ are 
µingrained¶ 7KHUH DUH no empty vessels that can be straightforwardly filled with 
scientific knowledge. According to Professor Davidson, an understanding of mental 
illness as a weakness of character prevents public engagement with genetic 
knowledge of mental illness. This point that people have existing ideas about mental 
illness that interact with public engagement is a subject Professor Norris discusses, 
with reference to stigmatising attitudes. 
 
³(YHU\RQH knows mental illness runs in families >«@ WKDW¶V been known for 
centuries. [«] I think in some societies WKDW¶V YHU\ stigmatising; in some 
eastern societies that is very stigmatised.  I think [...] ZH¶UHPXFKOHVVZRUULHG
about tainted blood in the west. [«] What people find stigmatising is for it to 
be suggested to them that their child has a psychiatric disorder because of the 
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way they might have brought them up, or because of the social circumstances 
WKDW WKH\ KDYH FUHDWHG IRU WKHP  , WKLQN ZH¶YH JRW WR turn this whole thing 
URXQG DFWXDOO\  ,W¶V VRPHWKLQJ , IHHO UDWKHU SDVVLRQDWH DERXW.´ 3URIHVVRU
Norris). 
 
Professor Norris suggests that the concept of µtainted blood¶ no longer holds much 
traction in Western society. InsteadµEODPH¶LVWKHPRVWLPSRUWant aspect of stigma to 
be challenged. A genetic explanation would undermine explanations of mental illness 
that blame parents, or families, or weaknesses of character. However, if, µLQ VRPH
eastern societies [tainted blood] LV YHU\ VWLJPDWLVHG¶, the cultural basis of stigma is 
clear. It is not just about an absence of biological knowledge. Psychiatric genetics in 
µHDVWHUQVRFLHWLHV¶ZRXOGQHHGGLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKHVWRSXEOLFHQJDJHPHQW 
 
While some scientists at the Centre accept that stigmatising attitudes are not simply 
the product of a belief that psychiatric disorders are not biological in origin, the belief 
that stigma will be diminished by the discovery of the biological basis of mental 
illness is widespread.  Professor Edwards is an exception: 
 
³TherH¶VWKDWW\SHRIVWLJPDWKH\DUHURWWHQWRWKHFRUHRUWKHLUSDUHQWVwere 
rotten to the core, and stuff like that. And I suppose it is imagined that a greater 
understanding, you know, that these are not necessarily disorders of personal 
[circumstances] could in principle reduce stigma. However  WKHUH¶VDOVRVWLJPD
and prejudice against people who have biological illnesses that are fully 
understood. [«] $FWXDOO\,GRQ¶WEHOLHYHWKDWDUHGXFWLRQLQVWLJPDQHFHVVDULO\
follows from a greater understanding of cause. [«] We know the causes of 
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Aids, we know the causes of venereal diseases. [«] $WWKHFRUHRIDOOWKLVLW¶V
true that a greater understanding does not QHFHVVDULO\DEROLVKVWLJPDDQG,¶P
not convinced it will increase it, but it just does not follow it will reduce it´
(Professor Edwards). 
 
Reviewing the literature, on mental illness and stigma, Goldacre (2010) writes that 
µSHRSOH ZKR ZDQW WR FRPEDW SUHMXGLFH PD\ QHHG WR FKDOOHQJH WKHLU own prejudices 
WRR¶, not least their own moral and cultural interpretations. Citing Phelan (2002), 
Goldacre recognises that there are different types of stigma and that establishing a 
genetic or biological basis of mental illness could  (i) create associative stigma for 
family members labelled as carriers, (ii) increase the length of stigma so it exists after 
symptoms have subsided VWDWLQJµSHUKDSVDSDUWQHUZLOOZRQGHU'R,UHDOO\ZDQWWR
ULVN KDYLQJ D FKLOG ZLWK WKLV SHUVRQ JLYHQ WKHLU JHQHWLF SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ"¶ DQG LLL
increase anticipatory stigma with young people experiencing stigma before showing 
any signs of hyperactivity or inattentiveness ± µGRWKH\KDYHWKLVFRQGLWLRQ MXVWOLNH
WKHLUIDWKHU"¶ Such genetic explanations may increase stigma and discrimination (Rose 
1998), reflecting the negative discourses of degeneration and hereditary familiar to 
Victorian psychiatrists. 
 
Publics have particular imaginaries of biomedical disorders in the same way that 
scientists have particular imaginaries of publics. Comparisons with cancer and other 
µSK\VLFDO LOOQHVVHV¶ PLJKt be useful, but given that research has shown that in 
developed societies stigma is typically attached to conditions of the mind rather than 
the body (Albrecht, Walker and Levy 1982), it is not a like-for-like model in so far as 
using public engagement to de-stigmatise mental illness goes.  
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Stigmatised Psychiatric Genetics (Therapeutic Optimists and Social Optimists) 
 
Scientists at the Centre, as scientists elsewhere, understand public engagement is at 
least partly a means of maintaining access to the resources required to do science. 
Public engagement, by presenting optimistic futures, is seen as a way to secure public 
and political support. It is also seen as a means of recruiting research participants. 
However, as we have seen, there is also a more high-minded purpose; to reduce the 
stigma of mental illness.  
 
However, while scientists at the Centre begin by speaking of the stigma of mental 
illness and their hope that public engagement, founded on their therapeutic optimism, 
might begin to reduce stigma, we also see the concept of stigma used to describe 
attitudes towards psychiatry and psychiatric genetics. According to centre members it 
is not just those with psychiatric conditions who are the victim of negative attitudes, 
but also those who work in psychiatry.  Through a process of marking (Hess, 1992; 
Simon, 1999), psychiatry is presented as being seen as not quite a µUHDO¶PHGLFLQHE\
the wider medical community spoiling the identity of psychiatrists as medics (see 
Goffman, 1963). 
 
³It [psychiatry] really is a joke when you are a medical student. You know, I 
mean, people really put you off it. I think there is stigma. At medical school 
\RXJHW LWDQGWKHQDIWHUZDUGV\RXNQRZSHRSOHVD\EXW\RXZHUHQ¶WRQHRI 
the weird ones´3URIHVVRU6WHYHQVRQ. 
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Yet, while psychiatry is positioned at the margins of medicine, it appears that 
psychiatric genetics is regarded with suspicion by the psychiatrists precisely for its 
µVFLHQWLVP¶WKRXJKWKHKLVWRU\RIWKHGLVFLSOLQHVFRQFHUQHGQRGRXEWSOD\VLQWRWKHVH
attitudes).  
 
³IW¶VDELJSUREOHPIRUSV\FKLDWU\DQGPRUHSDUWLFXODUO\IRUSDWLHQWV6RWKHUH¶V
D JHQHUDO LVVXH ZKLFK LV WKDW LQ 8. SV\FKLDWU\ IRU TXLWH D ORQJ WLPH WKHUH¶V
EHHQDWHUULEOHQLKLOLVPDERXWDQ\WKLQJVFLHQWLILF<RXNQRZDQGSDUWO\WKDW¶V
understandable because lots of times people have come up with some finding 
DQG LW¶V HLWKHU QRW EHHQ UHSOLFDWHG RU LW¶V QRW IHG WKURXJK WR DQ\ LPSDFW RQ
changing what you do with patients. [«] And so because of the way the UK 
psychiatric service is run - WKH\¶UHQRWVHWXSLQDVFLHQWLILFVRUWRIZD\WKH\¶UH
fairly de-PHGLFDOLVHG DQG LW¶V MXVW NLQG RI HDVier for people to kind of think: 
µOh well, you know, there is no science in this and nothing that gets published 
is actually worth knowing about¶[«] VR WKDW¶V D Jeneral thing.  And then 
WKHUH¶V D VSHFLILF WKLQJ ZKLFK LV , WKLQN TXLWH D ORW RI SHRSOH ZKR ZHQW LQWR
psychiatry or are in psychiatry have a scepticism about, biological in general 
and genetic in particular, explanations of illness and they just have a sort of 
idealistic or theoretical, philosophical abhorrence of it. Not all of them but a 
proportion of people. [ «]  
 
,PHDQGRQ¶W JHWPHZURQJ WKHUH¶OO EHSOHQW\RISV\FKLDWULVWVRXW WKHUHZKR
will have a perfectly balanced eclectic view of you know, social and 
psychological factors are important and biological factors too and you know 
WKDW¶V DOO ILQH%XW LQ WHUPVRIZKDW \RXU DYHUDJH MREELQJSV\FKLDWULVWZRXOG
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WKLQNWKH\ZRXOGQ¶WEHNHHSLQJXSWRGDWHZLWKWKHIDFWWKDWWKHUH¶VVWXIIJRLQJ
on.[«] Whereas LQWKH6WDWHVLW¶OOEHFRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQW [«] WKHUH¶VDOZD\V
EHHQPRUHH[FLWHPHQWDERXWVFLHQFHDQ\ZD\DQGWKHUH¶VDOZD\VEHHQPRUHVRUW
of expectation that psychiatrists would kind of know what was going on in 
QHXURVFLHQFHEHFDXVHLW¶VSUREDEO\JRLQJWR have an influence on the way they 
SUDFWLVHSV\FKLDWU\DWVRPHSRLQW%XWWKDW¶VQRWEHHQZKDW¶VEHHQingrained in 
British psychiatry.´ (Professor Davidson). 
 
For Professor Davidson, two factors are responsible for the attitudes towards 
psychiatric genetics within UK psychiatry. Historically, psychiatric genetics has failed 
to deliver. Findings have been inconsistent, have not been replicated, and ± most 
importantly ± treatments have not arrived. Again, we see the coupling of biological 
psychiatry with therapeutic optimism. For a psychiatrist, without this optimism there 
would be little value in taking a biological approach. The evidence that psychiatric 
illnesses are heritable has been available for some time (Kirov and Owen, 2009), but 
this general knowledge is of little use in mental healthcare, whilst it carries the risk 
that such knowledge might deepen stigmatisation. Professor Davidson is frustrated 
that the resulting mental health infrastructure is little equipped to incorporate new 
developments in psychiatric genetics into mental health. This also concerns Professor 
Johnson, who suggests that engagement with the people who will implement the 
findings of psychiatric genetics is vital.  
 
³,W¶VLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHLIZHGRPDNHDGYDQFHVWKDWPD\FKDQJHWKHway that 
we think about psychiatric genetics, or the way we think about treatments [« ] 
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LW¶V LPSRUWDQW WKDW WKH SHRSOH out there will need to implement those 
advances.´Professor Johnson). 
 
Professor Davidson also posits that psychiatric genetics is given short shrift within 
psychiatry because many psychiatrists are ideologically opposed to the application of 
genetics to questions of mental illness. A µtheoretical abhorrence¶ DV KH SXWV LW
though does not explore what it is about the histories of psychiatry and genetics that 
would produce such an attitude.  
 
In fact, scientists at the Centre make it clear that biological approaches to psychiatry 
are anathema in UK psychiatry.  
 
³,WKLQNLW¶VPRUHWKDQJHQHWLFV,WKLQNLW¶VWKHELRORJLFDOLQSV\FKLDWU\WKDW¶V
the issue, yeah. And I think people are very wedded still to kind of purely 
SV\FKRORJLFDO DQG HQYLURQPHQWDO ZD\V RI FRQVLGHULQJ SV\FKLDWULF LOOQHVV´
(Professor Johnson,).   
 
Thinking about 3URIHVVRU -RKQVRQ¶V division between those who take a biological 
approach and those who take a psychosocial approach, we can suggest that the split is 
not so much between therapeutic optimists and therapeutic pessimists, but between 
brands of optimism. Those in psychiatry who put the social and environmental at the 
heart of explanations of mental illness might well be social optimists. Some at the 
Centre view these people less than favourably. When given the summary of a 
literature review suggesting that a biological understanding of mental illness may 
increase stigma, Professor Norris responded. 
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³6R ELRJHQHWLF FDXVDO EHOLHIV LQ GLDJQRVWLF ODEHOOLQJ E\ WKH SXEOLF DUH
positively related to prejudice fear and desire for distance. [...] The people who 
think like this are educated, slightly left-wing people without scientific 
EDFNJURXQGVLQWKHVRIWHQGRIVFLHQFHVRUWKHKXPDQLWLHV´. (Professor Norris). 
    
Essentially, therapeutic optimists believe that pharmaceuticals and other µPHGLFDO¶
treatments can deal with mental illness. It is hard to be a therapeutic optimist unless 
mental illness is understood biologically. Social optimists believe that mental illness 
can be tackled by focussing on the social or environmental, at the level of the 
individual or as a public health issue. It is easiest to think this way if mental illness is 
understood as the product of social factors. 7KHVHWZRµRSWLPLVPV¶DUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\
mutually exclusive; being a therapeutic optimist does not demand that one is a social 
pessimist, and being a therapeutic pessimist does not demand one is a social optimist.   
 
Given Professor Davidson compares the attitudes of UK psychiatrists to the 
µWKHUDSHXWLFRSWLPLVP¶RISV\FKLDWULVWV LQ WKHUnited States it is important to briefly 
consider of the cultural and political differences between the countries. That the UK 
has a universal health care system, a welfare state, and a strong µsocial democratic¶ 
strain to its politics, which are absent or much less pronounced in the US, provides the 
bedrock on which social optimism might be founded. Again, when considering the 
ways in which scientists think about publics and public engagement, this asks us to 
consider the particular context of the science in question.  
 
Discussion 
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This paper is, first a demonstration that the social, political, and economic context of a 
particular scientific field influences the way in which scientists understand publics 
and public engagement. Specific scientific fields have distinctive publics. They 
engage with these different publics for different purposes: enrolling them for research, 
soliciting support from interest groups, promoting the specialism and its research to 
policy makers and stakeholders etc. 6WXGLHVRIµVFLHQFH¶DQGµVFLHQWLVWV¶REVFXUHWKLV
YDULDWLRQ MXVW DV VWXGLHV RI µWKH SXEOLF¶ KLGH WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK LPSRUWDQW SXEOLFs 
engage with science.  
 
Second, this paper is about psychiatric genetics, and shows the way in which  
scientists involved in psychiatric genetics use the language of µstigma¶ in a range of 
ways to justify  public engagement. Most obviously, there is a belief in a µdeficit 
model¶ of stigma ± that stigmatizing attitudes are the result of insufficient knowledge 
of the genetic (and therefore biological) causes of psychiatric disorders. µ6WLJPD¶ is 
also co-opted to do rhetorical work within medicine and science, marking differences 
in therapeutic optimism and outlook as pathological. Psychiatric geneticists are 
therapeutic optimists, who see themselves opposing a society dominated by 
therapeutic pessimism. This pessimism extends to the wider medical profession, 
which we see when scientists working in psychiatric genetics talk of their field as 
being stigmatized as well. Not only is psychiatry a poor relation to other branches of 
medicine, but psychiatric genetics is marginalised when compared to other large scale 
genetic studies of complex disease.  And, quite aside from any 'disciplinary sneer', 
with regard to wider publics, both psychiatry and genetics have identities that have 
EHHQ µVSRLOHG¶ E\ WKHLU troubled, controversial histories.  As psychiatric geneticists, 
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WKH\ RIWHQ IHHO RYHUVKDGRZHG E\ WKHLU GLVFLSOLQH¶V FRQWURYHUVLDO SDVW ± the stigmata 
WKDWPDUNVWKHLUPHPEHUVKLSRIDµVKDPHGFDVWH¶ (Goffman, 1963).  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that psychiatric geneticists justified public engagement 
as a means to tackle negative attitudes towards psychiatric genetics as well as a tool to 
reduce the stigma of mental illness.  Familiar with the language of stigma, psychiatric 
geneticists use the term in a variety of ways; people with mental illness are 
stigmatized, psychiatry is stigmatized, psychiatric genetics is stigmatized, therapeutic 
optimists are stigmatized.  Public engagement in which a programme of informing 
different groups of the biological basis of mental illness is posited as a means to 
UHGXFH WKHVH µVWLJPDV¶ LQYRNHV WKH µGHILFLW PRGHO¶, relying on the argument that if 
people outside the specialism knew more their attitudes would come to be more like 
those of the specialists.  
 
That the particular attitudes towards publics and public engagement held by 
psychiatric geneticists are not to be understood as directly transferrable to other areas 
of science it part of the point of this paper. These attitudes are the product of the 
historical, social and cultural context of the field, pointing to the necessity that studies 
RIVFLHQWLVWV¶DWWLWXGHV WRZDUGV publics and public engagement need to be studies of 
particular groups of scientists. Even if these studies do not explore the historical, 
social and cultural context of the field, its economics and its institutional specifics, the 
relative homogeneity of the group under study will produce informative results (even 
if these are not explained). The specificity of this paper is then its strength - the 
generalisable aspect of this paper is that fine grained specificity is a necessity in 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ VFLHQWLVWV¶ FRQFHSWLRQV RI SXEOLFV DQG SXEOLF HQJDJHPHQW WDNLQJ
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seriously Levy-Leblond¶V FDOO IRUPRUH sophisticated approaches to studying 
the relationship between scientists and the public. The degree of focus does not 
prevent some of the insights from this paper being applied more broadly, with the 
caveat that differences in scientific culture do matter (Gieryn 1999). 
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i
 The Research Excellence Framework (REF) is, and the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) was, the 
system used to assess the quality of research conducted in Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) in the 
UK. 
 
ii
 At a seminar observed by the author(s), a geneticist presented some work that demonstrated an 
association between a biological marker and schizophrenia. $QDXGLHQFHPHPEHUDVNHGµFRXOGWKLVEH
XVHGLQGLDJQRVLV"¶WRZKLFKWKHSUHVHQWHUUHSOLHGZLWKZRUGVWRWKHHIIHFWµZHOOPD\EH%XWLWZRXOG
VWLOOEHIDUPRUHDFFXUDWHWRDVNWKHPLIWKH\H[SHULHQFHGHOXVLRQV¶ 
 
iii
 If non-specialists are not to be consiGHUHGDµSXEOLF¶EHFDXVHWKH\KDYHH[SHULHQFHDQGRUH[SHUWLVHLQ
the related domains, then an argument can be made that almost any groups with any investment in 
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issues addressed by the science in question should not be considered publics. This would include 
SDWLHQWVFDUHUVSROLWLFLDQVZLWKUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUKHDOWKFDUHHWFDQGZRXOGPHDQWKDWµSXEOLF
HQJDJHPHQW¶ZRXOGPRVWRIWHQEHOLPLWHGWRHQJDJHPHQWZLWKJURXSVZLWKQRGLVFHUQLEOHVWDNHLQWKH
issues at hand. Of course, it may be the case that in some disciplines medical professionals might be 
considered disciplinary peers of those conducting basic research ± for example, in the case of cancer 
genetics it might very well be the case that oncologists are assumed to possess expertise in genetics that 
psychiatrists are presumed to lack. This adds weight to our argument that the resolution required to 
XQGHUVWDQGVFLHQWLVWV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVSXEOLFHQJDJHPHQWDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQQHHGVWREHSDUWLFXODUO\
fine. 
 
iv
 Psychiatric disorders have been, and contiQXHWREHGLVFXVVHGLQWHUPVRIµFKDUDFWHU¶DQGµPRUDOLW\¶
LQZD\VWKDWµVRPDWLF¶LOOQHVVHVDUHQRW 
